Search results for "Coordination game"
showing 10 items of 16 documents
Consensus in inventory games
2008
This paper studies design, convergence, stability and optimality of a distributed consensus protocol for n-player repeated non cooperative games under incomplete information. Information available to each player concerning the other players' strategies evolves in time. At each stage (time period), the players select myopically their best binary strategy on the basis of a payoff, defined on a single stage, monotonically decreasing with the number of active players. The game is specialized to an inventory application, where fixed costs are shared among all retailers, interested in reordering or not from a common warehouse. As information evolves in time, the number of active players changes t…
Coordination games with asymmetric payoffs: An experimental study with intra-group communication
2020
Abstract Two alternative modes of reasoning in coordination games are prominently discussed in the literature: level-k thinking and team reasoning. In order to differentiate between the two modes of reasoning, we experimentally investigate payoff-asymmetric coordination games using an intra-group communication design that incentivizes subjects to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. We find that the reasoning process is significantly different between games. In payoff-symmetric games, team reasoning plays an important role for coordination. In payoff-asymmetric games, level-k reasoning results in frequent miscoordination. Our study clearly illustrates how small differences between …
Noncooperative dynamic games for inventory applications: A consensus approach
2008
We focus on a finite horizon noncooperative dynamic game where the stage cost of a single player associated to a decision is a monotonically nonincreasing function of the total number of players making the same decision. For the single-stage version of the game, we characterize Nash equilibria and derive a consensus protocol that makes the players converge to the unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Such an equilibrium guarantees the interests of the players and is also social optimal in the set of Nash equilibria. For the multi-stage version of the game, we present an algorithm that converges to Nash equilibria, unfortunately not necessarily Pareto optimal. The algorithm returns a seque…
Heterogeneous network games: Conflicting preferences
2013
Proceeding at: 2nd Annual UECE Lisbon Meeting: Game Theory and Applications, took place 2010, November, 4-6, in Lisbon (Portugal). The event Web site http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~uece/lisbonmeetings2010/ In many economic situations, a player pursues coordination or anti-coordination with her neighbors on a network, but she also has intrinsic preferences among the available options. We here introduce a model which allows to analyze this issue by means of a simple framework in which players endowed with an idiosyncratic identity interact on a social network through strategic complements or substitutes. We classify the possible types of Nash equilibria under complete information, finding two thr…
Cooperation and cultural transmission in a coordination game
2009
Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyze if cooperation can be the product of cultural evolution in a two-stage coordination game, consisting of a production stage followed by a negotiation phase. We present an overlapping generations model with cultural transmission of preferences where the distribution of preferences in the population and the strategies are determined endogenously and simultaneously. There are several groups in the society; some of them play cooperatively and others do not. Socialization takes place inside the group, but there is a positive rate of migration among groups which parents anticipate. Our main result shows that all groups converge to the cooperative equili…
Defense versus Opulence? An Appraisal of the Malthus-Ricardo 1815 Controversy on the Corn Laws
2015
This article proposes a rational reconstruction of the arguments of Malthus and Ricardo in their 1815 essays, Grounds of an Opinion and An Essay on Profits, whereby a policy of free corn trade was repudiated and endorsed, respectively. Malthus envisaged defense and (trade-induced) opulence as two mutually alternative options and, if required to make a choice, he had no hesitation in choosing the former. By contrast, Ricardo excluded any such trade-off, arguing that even in the case of war or poor domestic harvest, foreign agricultural countries would be seriously damaged if they opted for restrictions on their corn exports to Great Britain.
Authority and Coordination
1995
There are many possible starting points for attempts to link authority with the coordination of human interactions: the most famous forerunner here is of course David Hume with his theory of justice. I will, however, start from a more recent classic. Herbert A. Simon’s Administrative Behaviour (1945, 2nd ed. 1957) includes an important theory for the role of authority. It is an obvious sign of the lack of communication between different branches and traditions in social theory that many jurists and political theorists emphasizing the coordinative functions of authority have paid no attention to Simon’s classical book.
Nash codes for noisy channels
2012
This paper studies the stability of communication protocols that deal with transmission errors. We consider a coordination game between an informed sender and an uninformed decision maker, the receiver, who communicate over a noisy channel. The sender's strategy, called a code, maps states of nature to signals. The receiver's best response is to decode the received channel output as the state with highest expected receiver payoff. Given this decoding, an equilibrium or "Nash code" results if the sender encodes every state as prescribed. We show two theorems that give sufficient conditions for Nash codes. First, a receiver-optimal code defines a Nash code. A second, more surprising observati…
The Coordination Problem in Regional Integration
2021
A catch-22 situation or coordination failure between the slow creation of well-integrated regional markets and low economic diversification (plus sophistication and specialization) is unfolding in Africa. Ubiquitous trade barriers translate into a paradoxical tariff pattern by which African neighbours are treated worse than remote trade partners. In the face of widespread irregularities and high trade costs, ‘trade facilitation’ has become an important technical approach to easing trade with the support of donor agencies. This chapter examines the systemic potential and limits of trade facilitation programmes. As a general alternative to institution-heavy, imperfect integration along the tr…
Existence and Optimality of Nash Equilibria in Inventory Games
2005
Abstract This paper studies the stability and optimality of a distributed consensus protocol for n -player repeated non cooperative games under incomplete information. At each stage, the players choose binary strategies and incur in a payoff monotonically decreasing with the number of active players. The game is specialized to an inventory application, where fixed costs are shared among all retailers, interested in whether reordering or not from a common warehouse. The authors focus on Pareto optimality as a measure of coordination of reordering strategies, proving that there exists a unique Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium that verifies certain stability conditions.